Mountain Clients

‘In the dangerous world of international mountaineering John Barry is a legend. (?) He has commanded the Army’s (Royal Marines) Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre and was once director of Britain’s premier climbing centre (that Pillar of Learning) Plas-y-Brenin in Snowdonia. The former Royal Marine Captain is proud of his historic first ascents of the world’s toughest mountains.

But today John Barry’s glittering career is in shreds. He has been stripped of his membership (for a while) of the British Mountain Guides for ‘professional misconduct’ following an accident on the Eiger in which three young British men (clients) died.

Phil Davies, of Southport, Merseyside (died sixteen days later in his mother’s arms) Willie Dunnachie, of Glasgow; and Douglas Gains of Harlow, Essex; died on the Eiger’s Western Flank on July 25, 1992 (Willie’s two sons joined mountainclients in 2005 and 2007).

Today (18 anniversary of the accident) Phil’s parents still cannot forgive John Barry. Graham, the father of Phil Davies, a Royal Marine reservist, Graham says: “There are those still alive who are culpable for this tragedy. There should have been a full inquiry.”

Edward Gaines, Douglas Gaines’s father, adds: “My thoughts on Mr Barry are unprintable.” His son and 15 other people from the ironically named – Survival Club, which specialised in exotic adventure holidays, travelled to Switzerland on July 18, 1992, to climb the ‘Big Three’ – the Eiger, Mont Blanc and the Matterhorn. Although most had some mountaineering experience, others had never attempted such a combination of expeditions.

Promoting the £375, two week trip, the aptly named Survival Club, whose director was – John Barry (BMG) said: ‘The Mont Blanc, Eiger and Matterhorn climbs are technically easy and within the scope of fit hill walkers…you do not need any previous experience.’ (Really!)

In reality, the Eiger is a killer mountain, a dangerous place on which, far too many people have died.

The party consisted of four experienced guides but only John Barry had a carnet, the supposed internationally recognised licence. On Monday, July 20, the party went by rail to Eismeer – the main starting point for Eiger climbers. The 16 started their ascent in separate roped parties, moving up to the Mittelligi hut where they spent the night.

The group woke at 5:00 am on Tuesday and decided to ascend the knife-edged Mittellegi Ridge (a graded climb) leading to the 3,970-metre peak.

But within hours, two of the parties were making very slow progress and Barry decided to return to Eismeer with these, including his own son, Tank,14. ‘I thought the two other more experienced parties would be down later that evening,’ he says.

Under the guidance of (unqualified, according to Bill O’Conner BMG) Dave Halton and (unqualified, according to Bill O’Conner BMG) Jan Rowe, a Faulkland veteran, and former contemporary of Barry’s from the Royal Marines, the two other parties continued up the mountain.

At midday the weather began to deteriorate. The official Swiss police report in to the accident says the group had been warned of heavy thunderstorms, although John Barry denies this: “The weather forecast was not bad, the storm was not predicted and talk of the mountain being in poor condition was nonsense”, he said.

According to notes compiled by Alison Summers, the only woman amongst the remaining climbers, a storm hit them half way up the mountain. The soles of their boots were scorched by lightening and the two parties lost each other.

Alison’s group, led by Dave Halton, set up a bivouac near the Fourth Step on the ridge. They had no stoves as these had been sent down by mistake with the less experienced climbers. They had no tents and only insulated sleeping bags. At a campsite below Eisner John Barry was not worried when the eight did not return by nightfall: “They all had bivvie bags and good clothing and Jan Rowe (unqualified according to O’Conner), who was leading the second group, is brilliant in emergencies.”

Next day, Wednesday July 22, the storm continued and the climbers could make only slow progress because of thick fog and light snowfall. But the two parties met up, reached the summit and then searched for a route down the Western Flank. They started moving down to about 3,600 metres, where they set up a bivouac for a second night.

But their descent was difficult. According to Alison Summers, no one had a route map – because John Barry had torn out the appropriate page from the guidebook. By evening Alison was becoming cold: ‘Spent rest of the night trying to keep awake and somewhat concerned I was about to slide down the mountain’, she wrote in her notes.

Dave Halton recalls: ‘By the second night in the open we were all very tired. It was really impossible to move any further.’

John Barry, still at the foot of the mountain, was beginning to worry. He called Air Glaciers, a local helicopter company, and arranged to fly next day with Bruno Durrer, who is both a doctor and mountain guide, to check on the climbers.

At six the next morning the helicopter took of. Within ten minutes the pilot, Daniel Brunner, spotted the climbers. “I was staggered that they were all in military-style sleeping bags. Anyone on this fairly straightforward climb should not take such bulky equipment,’ he said. When Dr Durrer and Barry landed they asked if the climbers wanted to come off: ‘I entreated them to come down with the helicopter”, Dr Durrer recalls: “They declined my offer. The whole episode was foolhardy from the start and the British climbers should have come down with us.” Yet Barry insists: “They were in great form, pleased with themselves. I decided to stay and come down with them. The doctor left.”

The climbers including John Barry, who now remained with them, moved off. By 11 am the sun was out but many of the rocks were covered in black ice. There were three parties. First to leave was John Barry, roped to the weak and cold Alison Summers, followed by Jan Rowe leading (we now know he was unroped at the front) Dunnachie, Davies and Gaines. Then came Dave Halton guiding the two other climbers, Paul Roose and Lanning Vogel. Barry made good speed and was soon ahead. But 15 minutes later he heard a cry behind. He recalls: “To my horror I saw someone had slipped. A figure was sliding across a patch of snow and pulling the others with him. I turned Alison’s head away. I told her not to look. I unroped (from the weak and cold Alison) and ran across. I discovered three of them, but I could not find Jan (not roped to the three) although I could hear him shouting. I checked the breathing of the three others; I thought they were all dead.”

John Barry headed down the mountain alone and alerted the rescue service at 12:25 pm. The first helicopter carrying Dr Durrer, again, arrived half an hour later. Phil Davies was in fact in a critical condition and Jan Rowe concussed with broken bones and a ruptured liver. Dr Durrer insisted the expedition must be abandonded. But even then, some of the surviving climbers argued with him: “I had to order them off the mountain”, he recalls.

In February (1993) an inquest at Southport, ruled that Phil Davies’s and Douglas Gaines’s deaths were accidental. There has never been an inquest into the death of 34-year-old William Dunnachie. Yet the Swiss Police report into the tragedy criticises both John Barry and the other leaders (there were no criminal charges or deportations). It points out that Swiss guides are allowed to take only two climbers each on the Eiger. And, significantly, it says that during descents the guide – must always – go down last – roped – to this clients. Yet Jan Rowe went down – first, his party roped (there is now a question mark in Rowes case) behind him.The report stresses: ‘Countless – mistakes were made (basic errors). The choice of route was not suitable for the abilities of the guests (clients). The ground rule “the weakest determines the speed” was clearly not followed: ‘Little attention was paid to the weather forecast and weather development during the climb. To build a four-rope party with partly begginners in this terrain must be judged as careless.’ (Swiss Police Report).

John Barry is appealing against the withdrawl of his guiding carnet.  He says: ‘I was not on the mountain for most of the time (why?) and when I did go up I found them in good shape and decided to come down with them. I was not with the party that slipped (he could see quite clearly that Jan Rowe was not safeguarding his ropes from the rear and did nothing about it) and did everything I could to help (not acording the Phil Davies parents). But the question remains: Why did Barry, the only qualified guide, leave the mountain instead of staying with the rest of the climbing party? Why did he not check the weather reports properly? Why did he not, like Dr Durrer, insist the climbers come off the mountain? And why did he not make the party follow the proper descent (safety) rules?

And yet, Barry feels that he did little wrong. But for Edward Gaines, father of 28-year-old Douglas, that can never be enough. He says: ‘I never understood why my son loved climbing. My best memory of him is when he returned from a previous climb of Mont Blanc. He was on cloud nine. I was worried and told him to join a ‘proper’ (BMC/BMG) climbing club – that’s what he did – the Survival Club.’