Monday, June 2nd, 2008
The AALA Ridiculed…
Set up as a knee-jerk reaction after four canoeists drowned in Lyme Bay (whilst under instruction in 1993 – the adventure center manager was imprisoned), the AALA, failed to act when (in December, 1998) just two years after its licensing of adventure activities started, four BMG clients were killed in an avoidable, Scottish avalanche and er, nobody served a prison sentence (er, not likely to either whilst members of the BMG are licensing members of the – BMG).
Daily Mail, Thursday, Oct 19, 2006: A report by the government ‘Better Regulations Commission’: ‘has ridiculed*’ the Adventure Activities Licensing Authority set up in 1996 in the aftermath of the Lyme Bay canoeing disater (1993) in which four teenage canoeists drowned.’
* Sir Paul Judge wrote: ‘In 1993, 53 people died in their bath but none of those tragedies appeared on the front page of the national press. I suppose we should be grateful that nobody started a campaign to inspect (step forward the – AALA surely?) all of our baths and how we approach them (jumars, fixed ropes, waterwings etc) to make sure that they are safe and that we are properly trained (qualified surely?) for the task of using them. However in the same year, 1993, four childen were drowned (infact many, many more children drowned in 1993) in a boating accident at Lyme Bay. The result of the uproar was a classical case of the Law of Unintended Consequences which is the action of people – and especially government (and those jumping on the lucrative bandwagon of course) – always have effects that are unanticipated or “unintended.”
According to the ‘Better Regulation Commission’ too many laws have been created without thought for alternatives or adverse consequences – step forward the Adventure Activities Licensing Authority (AALA) who’s Mission States: ‘The AALA is an independent…’ Independent that is, with at least three, BMG members and four BMC members on its staff.? You have to give them credit (they aquired PyB along with £450,00 per annum, for nil consideration at the same time – 1996) you could’nt write the script for it.
The setting up of the AALA (along with over £1m per annum) was a knee-jerk reaction to four clients dying on an outdoor pursuit, canoeing course. The course center’s manager at Lyme Bay, was given a three month prison sentence. When four BMG clients were killed under consolidating snow and ice (in 1998 just five years after Lyme Bay) in an avoidable Scottish avalanche, no prison sentence was handed down – the guide was found to be – not at fault. To the contrary, the BMG guide in charge of that fatal winter climbing party, went on to become the full time – Scottish Mountain Safety Officer – licensed of course by the – AALA.
The Commision Report goes on: ‘It (the BMC / BMG lead AALA) requires organisations running activities such as white-water rafting (also climbing and mountaineering) to be licensed (no license – no insurance). But while only 30 organisations have been refused licenses (it pay’s to know the right people) 600 activity centre’s have closed thanks to the additional costs involved.’ Plas-y-Brenin, the government ‘pig-in-a-poke’ in North Wales, for example, with its annual, government subsidy of £450,000 would of course, have no problem in meeting those extra costs. What with at least 600 members of the competition put out of business, along with sustantial (a wapping rolling) grant the two BMG run centre’s (Glenmore Lodge mentioned below) are laughing all the way to the bank. I would have thought that the Office for Fair Trading would have been interested in this unfair situation. It would not be the first time that the Office for Fair Trading has had to look into, and comment on, underhanded method’s being employed in the ‘climbing establishment’.
The same of course, goes for that other ‘Pillar of Learning’ Glenmore Lodge. Both ‘center’s of excellence’ would have been the first to received their AALA License when one looks at the make-up; the individual’s who grasped the running of the AALA at its conception with both hands. The word cronyism come to mind, but most probably I am wrong. Sir Judge continued: “As a result, since 1996 literally millions of children activity experiences have not taken place.”
This of course was the long term, intended result of the BMG ‘attempting to, and finally achieving, the drawing of a line across society, those who could not afford / could not justify a 100 pounds per day for instruction must go into the hills and mountains alone – unguided, with no supervision. Half of the activity centre’s having finally, been put out of business (1996 – 2006). Langmuir’s original copy stated in Appendix 1V: ‘It is not intended that those individuals with the desired ‘qualities’ and experience (but not the peice of paper) be put out of work…’ This is exactly what has happened; has been engineered.
The challenge he said: “is that its not just about having rigorous and robust rules – its in making people stick to them.” Ian Peter, Chief Executive of Plas-y-Brenin (thatPillar of Learning in North Wales) according to the Guardian, Feb, 2000. Just what are these- rigorous and robust rules…and where do they eminate from?
Plas-y-Brenin (PyB) it was: that hosted the ‘Protect and Survive’ seminar the details of which, were published in the January, 1989 issue of High Mountain Sport (the then official magazine of the BMC) along with a full page colour photograph. The seminar, which was heavily attended by ‘official’ mountain guides and instructors and manufacturers supposedly discussed the most up to date use of ice axes and crampon and other pieces of modern ice climbing/winter mountaineering protection…
The full page colour picture shows two ice climbers high on a mountain face belayed to a single, not well placed, ice screw. Also in the picture, but not being employed in the belay, are two ice axes.
Ironically, eighteen months later, a member of the Association of British Mountain Guides (BMG) who may well have attended the – Protect and Survive seminar at - PyB, a centre that teaches; makes sure that people stick to – rigorous and robust safety rules, climbed away from his client high on the North face of the Tour Ronde an ice climb in the French Alps, belayed in an identicle manner – to a single ice screw. When the guide fell, the dangerous belay failed and he dragged his client to his death. The guide of course and as usual – of the BMC) along with a full page colour photograph. The seminar, which was heavily attended by ‘official’ mountain guides and instructors and manufacturers supposedly discussed the most up to date use of ice axes and crampon and other pieces of modern ice climbing/winter mountaineering protection…
The full page colour picture shows two ice climbers high on a mountain face belayed to a single, not well placed, ice screw. Also in the picture, but not being employed in the belay, are two ice axes.
Ironically, eighteen months later, a member of the Association of British Mountain Guides (BMG) who may well have attended the – Protect and Survive seminar at - PyB, a centre that teaches; makes sure that people stick to – rigorous and robust safety rules, climbed away from his client high on the North face of the Tour Ronde an ice climb in the French Alps, belayed in an identicle manner – to a single ice screw. When the guide fell, the dangerous belay failed and he dragged his client to his death. The guide of course and as usual – survived.
Some more rigorious and robust rules are highlighted below…
Robust Rule No 1: The guide always descends behind the client so that he can control any slip or fall.
Mike Rheinbereger (client) was left at the top of the Second Step on Everest’s North Ridge by his guide who had descended the Step ahead of him; gone down before him. Because Mike was unable to descend; he was snow-blind; weak and confused, he was left; abandoned by his guide. Had the guide sent Rheinbereger down the Step first; lowering him if necessary, then it is possible, that Mike would not have been left to died alone in such a terrible condition; a diabolical, avoidable sitiuation.
On the 13 May, 1999, a client of the commercial expedition company, OTT/BMG (IGO 8000)was left on the summit slopes of Everest by his guide. Had the guide been descending behind the client, he would not have lost contact with the client. The guide in fact should have been roped to the client – he was not.
In both cases, the expedition that had brought these clients to the upper slopes of Everest, did not have the means to effect a rescue. In Rheinberger’s case, the expedition leader, over the radio told the guide to descend and leave the client behind. That disgaceful episode was totally avoidable. And yet, quite acceptable.??
The Daily Telegraph, Oct 4, 2001: ‘Leader – left death fall Scout alone on the peak.’ The situations mentioned above were no different.
Three clients of the Association of British Mountain Guides were killed in a fall down the West Flank of the Eiger in July, 1992. Their guide was descending first; not last and in the ensuing fall by the last client the guide was not able to stop the falling client(s). One of the clients died in his mother’s arms after failing to emerge from a coma…16 days later. The guide of course – survived. Your guide must always descend last. Rule No 1.
Robust Rule No 2: The Mail on Sunday, 28 January – 2001
Jane Bussman wrote an article after her failed attempt on Mont Blanc. She was on a BMG ‘Jagged Globe’ alpine course. Several of her comments in the article were alarming bearing in mind that she was a client but, it was the photograph that accompanies the article that really caught my attention. Jane is pictured, ice-axe strapped safely onto her rucksack, approaching a huge crevasse with trekking poles as she walks on a ‘wet’ glacier. Her safety helmet also, is obviously tucked safely away – inside her rucksack.
For several years now, I have been collecting pictorial evidence of ‘qualified’ guides leading their clients across wet glaciers, the guide and client both supporting themselves with – ski-sticks. Jane in the comments above, is using ski-sticks; holding them in the photograph, rather than an ice-axe for self-rescue in an emergency – especially on a wet glacier.
On a ‘dry’ glacier, all of the; most of the crevasses are evident, there are still huge ‘chambers’ hidden under thin sheets of ice. On a ‘wet glacier’, the vast majority of crevasses are – hidden with, by a layer of snow. The ice-axe for self-arrest is therefore vital when travelling across – any glacier.
Fall into a crevasse whilst not wearing a helmet and you can be severely injured by falling blocks of ice following you in. Who looks after the ‘qualified’ guides clients when the guide, many of whom distain the wearing of helmets when walking on glaciers, are injured or killed? It has happened!
In 1992, I was called to a dangerous situation on the Mer de Glace above Chamonix. Whilst practicing crevasse rescue with some clients. We were hailed from a distance by a lone woman standing on the flat ice. Walking across to her, she pointed into a crevasse infront of her. In the bottom of it was the crumpled figure of a man. He had tripped over his own crampons and fallen head-first into the twenty foot crevasse. He was jammed, where the crevasse narrowed, his neck almost twisted back-to-front and he was very badly lacerated. I effected his rescue and took him back to Montenvers. His injuries would have been much less, if he had been wearing a helmet – he was not. Wearing goves – he was not. His ice-axe? Not fixed to his wrist by a loop, disappeared into the narrowing, almost bottomless cravasse. he, was a very lucky man.
Robust Rule No: 3… I could fill a web site with – robust rules that have been broken time and time again by – qualified guides, qualified to – strict safety criteria… Who quite obviously stick to rigorous and robust safety – rules. I don’t think! To survive in Outdoor Pursuits, the Scouts Association has just been told (2000) that not only must its instructors follow – rigorous and robust safety rules, it must also ensure – they ‘stick to them’. Just like members of the Association of British Mountain Guides do…
‘Daniel’s victory for father he never knew.’
The Independent, 21 June, 1997.
‘Guide must pay boy of 6 £200,000 for mistake that led to fatal fall.’: Climbers (the establishment with vested interests) reacted with astonishment yesterday after a judge ruled that a mountaineering guide negligently caused the death of a friend (a client insured with the BMC) by failing to follow “standard” safety procedures for climbing on ice. Mr Justice Dyson said that Scottish-based David Cuthbertson, 49, had ingnored “elementory and fundimental” practice.
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