Archive for the ‘Accidents’ Category

Helicopter Rescue (30 Sep 2003)

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

On the afternoon of Thu, 6 March, 2003, a helicopter rescue took place high on the right flank of Sierra Toix West at Calpe, Spain. A climber, part of a ‘services climbing course’ received head injuries from falling rock(s) (it is not known if he was wearing a helmet and certainly no helmet was visible on the injured man whilst he was strapped helplessly, to the rescue strecher) and a rescue team was called.
After two approaches, the helicoper finally hovered some twenty five feet above the group (six or seven people) of rescuers and the injured climber and the strecher were clipped to a cable that had been lowered. Suddenly, a large, loose sheet of thin plastic (thermal blanket) rose into the air on the updraft and was sucked into the helicopter rotors with a bang. Fortunately, one rescuer had the presence of mind to unclip the strecher as the helicopter staggered away with an obvious problem. The group as a whole, in such a confined space,  were very fortunate that the helicopter did not crash onto them causing a catastrophic disaster.
Fortunately, the helicopter landed without incident some 1,000 feet lower on an empty road. Shortly aftrewards as the ground rescuers prepared to lower the injured climber, the helicopter restarted and effected a perfect rescue.  Two hours prior to the accident, members of the same group had to callout to climbers beneath them regarding falling rocks that they had knocked down. The wearing of helmets should be mandatory when climbing, and if involved in a helicopter rescue, it is essential that all loose objects are held down or packed away. A similar account of this rescue was printed (sent in by Dennis M) in the Costa Blanca News on the 19 March, 2003.
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Finally, The Book… (5 Feb 2003)

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

On the 13 Sept, 2002, Lynda Woodroffe wrote in responce to my answering e-mail: “You did not cause me discomfort at all – please do not aòlogise. Any discomfort is due to the loss and the cause of it. I am very pleased (as I said) to have found your website.
Please feel free to use the information – I have written an unpublished book about climbing/the whole scenario surrounding Gerry,s death and have all the details of the court-case, expert opinions etc. There were some suspicious goings on, I have to say, which are revealed in the book. I have not edited it yet – as I wrote it some time ago and was rushing it a bit after the court-case. It brought out a very useful catharsis.”
In responce to my comment: ´It was the extremely long time 1990-1997 (between the accident and the court-case) that intrigued me´, that Lynda responded: ´We were insured by the BMC as was Smiler Cuthbertson. I knew that something had happened to cause the fall and wanted the police report. I, we, my friends, a French friend and my solicitor wrote to/rang up the Chamonix police but could not get the police to send the report. So we did not have a leg to stand on.’
I had 3 years to make a case against the (BMG) guide (according to the insurance and legal rules). I had Daniel 8 months after Gerry was killed, so things were put on the back burner. Some political friends suggested to me that I press on with the case and told me to get my MP to get the police report out of France. He called the Foreign Office and they had 3 attempts to get the report. On, the third attempt, it arrived – this made it 3 years and about 3weeks after the accident!!! Is that suspicious or what????´ The time was extended deliberately – I believe…
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Finally, The Truth (18 Jan 2003)

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

I was some what shocked to receive an e-mail form, Lynda Woodroffe on the 12 Sep, 2002: “I found your website whilst wasting time on the internet and looking to see how many times my late husband – Gerry Hedley came up. I was pleased to find your interesting texts and sad to be remined of the wastage of life through unecessary accidents. Gerry,s and my son, Daniel, is now 11 years old. ” (See Guide not to Blame) on this site regarding Gerry Hedley and his BMG guide Smiler Cuthertson,s avoidable mountaineering accident.
I had tried to contact Lynde, to no avail, when the details of the accident finally became public knowledge in 1997 – seven years after her husbands death. Lynda was made to wait – seven years before she was finally compensated for her loss. She was initially hindered in the first three years of her claim when important information was not forthcoming from the French Alps. These delays pushed Lynda over the legal – three year limit for such compensation claims. Lynda faught the case in her sons name… Even after her successful claim, money was apparently, made available for an – appeal against her just claim. 
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Eiger Sanction 2 (7 Nov 2005)

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

The question therefore as to be asked, if the independent guide was in fact – not tied to the clients, why was Mr Davies informed that the guidein fact did fall and was seriously injured? Why, was Mr Davies request for his son´s rucksack, climbing equipment never satisfied? So many questions but no real answers.
According to a climbing magazine (Climber or High) in 2001) John Barry and Jan Rowe had recently just enjoyed a climbing holiday together in East Africa. Mr Davies, on the other hand, has apparently, not yet managed to find, meet Mr Rowe (one of the untouchables) over the details (to ask him how he became detached – from his son´s rope – if he was ever attached) of his son´s death since the Eiger accident -thirteen years ago.
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Eiger Sanctioned (27 Sep 2003)

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

On the 30 November, 2002, I received an email from Bill O´Conner (BMG): ”Let me pick you up on just two points: OTT is not a member of the BMG. Was not, as the company no longer exists, folding after loosing Michael Mathews in May, 199.” My comment was merely: OTT/IGO 8000/BMG/IFMGA . OTT a founded member of – IGO 8000 which they were). (Second point) ´Eiger Accident: the guide in charge of the clients who died on the Eiger was in fact an ex-Royal Marine and an unqualified (being employed by a BMG guide on behalf of  the Survival Club) guide, like yourself (and Mal Duff who had few peers). The only member of the BMG (John Barry)  a qualified guide (also an ex-Marine) was in fact  not on the mountain at the time of the accident having turned back, several days before with some of his clients (including his son – Tank) during the ascent because he was unhappy about conditions and weather and the state of some of the clients (unacclimatised as they were). In this case the unqualified ex-Royal Marine, there were two of them, continued on; were allowed to continue by their employer, John Barry and were descending ahead of his clients unroped (!!) when the accident happened. But the important thing to point out is that in both cases no qualified guides were involved in the accident.”  “The BMG guide in question was not even on the mountain when the fatal accident occurred having left the mountain days earlier with his clients.” To the contrary (this is contrary to the Swiss police accident report)
Yes, the BMG guide did leave the mountain with – a number of clients including his own -son. But, he came back to the mountain via helicopter and joined the  groups for their final descent on that fatal  morning. The BMG guide was not only on the mountain.? He witnessed the rope decending  just before the fatal slip – guide first (or as Mr O´Conner now points out – unroped from their guide), he also witnessed the fall: “Í turned Alison´s head away so that she would not see the entire fall…” They were that close.
According to The Mail on Sunday (1994) Investigative Journalist, Nick Fielding.  The lead, BMG guide, sanctioned the leading of two of the three ropes on that fatal day by, as Mr O´Conner put´s it: by unqualified guides. Graham Davies, the father of Phil Davies who died, kept asking me, six years after the accident, how it was possible for the guide to become unroped from his clients (he had been told that Jan Rowe became unattached from the rope during the fall) as the rope did not break. ‘Did the rope come over his head?,’ he asked. ‘Did he come out of his harness.’? And I was trying to show him how it is possible to come out of a sit-harness. When all along, Mr Davies was being mislead into not knowing the truth, that his son´s rope was not tied to a guide ´qualified or otherwise. The answer is now all too clear. The BMG guide would have been aware that the fatal party was unrope from – any guide, and yet failed to inform Mr Davies of this when he visited the lead guide at his North Wales home. Mr Davies, gave me a six page copy of the conversation that took place. 
What is plainly obvious, from Mr O´Conner´s email, there are two types of – unqualified guides in Europe. The unqualified guides who work – for BMG guides (working for gain in Europe) and unqualified guides, who have to be put out of business at all costs… There are apparently, (untouchable) unqualified guides, good friends of BMG guides, and those unqualified guides who were warned that full publicity would be given to any problems that they have… Mr O´Conner went on.´The BMG member unlike the unqualified ex Royal Marines had to face a disciplinary committee of the guides association. It was felt that he should have had more input into the actions of the unqualified ex Marines. He lost his licence (no he did not) and after a number of years of not being allowed to work as a guides (?) had to retrain and re qualify (not true). The unqualified self appointed guides (like those unqualified, self appointed British climbers/guides who started ISM at Leysin, in Switzerland under the very nose of Swiss authority – page 113 in Dougal Houston’s ‘The Philosophy of Risk’, set’s it out quite nicely) simply carried on. They came before no disciplinary committee (or Fatal Accident Inquiry), no one questioned their actions they continued to practice (with no publicity from the BMC the sports Governing Body) without reference to others or agreed standards (agreed by whom – certainly not me).” Like the catalogue of errors from start to finish during the 1992 – Eiger Sanction. The 1994 Mail on Sunday article by Nick fielding, is seen in full in the: Eiger Sanction page in this web-site.
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14 Climbers Died in a single Accident.

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

In July, 1964, five UIAGM, Chamonix Guides took nine aspirant guides (ENSA mountain clients) under instruction, into slab-avalanche conditions high on the Aigulle Verte above the French alpine resort of Chamonix. In the ensuing avalanche, all fourteen were swept down the Cordier Coulior to their deaths… In the intervening years (to 2008) the UIAGM has been irradicating experienced mountaineers with the correct attitude from the professional climbing scene – because they supposedly, did not come up to UIAGM standards…
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Abseiling Accident

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

According to a Thread on the Rocfax site, a climber has explained how his climbing partner, who fell whilst abseiling in Zion national Park, methis avoidable death. Apparently, they were tying two ropes together for each abseil with an ‘overhand’ knot (there has recently been ‘official’ recognition by the British Mountaineering Council – responsible for safety in climbing in the use, the joining of ropes with knots other than the double-fisherman which is perfectly safe even when tied incorrectly). The two ropes that parted during the fatal abseil apparently had no reminants of a knot in either end. Apparently, the knot had completely unravelled. Too many experienced climbers have died whilst absieling, a manouver where all of the equipment is stressed. Do yourself a favour by tying absiel ropes together by using the double-fisherman knot, a knot that incidentally, is shown tied incorrectly, hapazardly on the front cover of the BMC’s booklet of Knots, price £4:00 to non members…

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IGO 8000 Statement 4 April, 2002

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

On the morning of 30 April, 2002, a 38 year old British climber, Peter Legate fell to his death during an expedition to climb Mount Everest. Theavoidable accident, occured while descending fixed ropes from Camp 3 (7,100 meters) on the Lhotse face. Mr Legate who was not roped to a guide, fell into a crevasse from where it was impossible to recover his body. Mr Legate was a member (client) of a commercial expedition operated by Himalayan Guides, a member of International Guiding Operators 8000 (IGO 8000) at the – cuttting edge of Himalayan safety when it come to mountain clients. IGO 8000 will be conducting (another) inquiry into an accident involving one of its clients. IGO 8000, at the leading edge of client safety, has apparently, extended its deepest sympathy to Mr Legate’s family. The boss and one of the leaders of Himalayan Guides – Mr Henry Barclay Todd referred to elswhere on the Internet as the Toddfather, was not available (he is reported to be somewhere in Tibet) to comment on the avoidable accident to one of his clients.
It remains to be seen if the British Mountaineering Council will finally – give full publicity to this latest Himalayan Guides/IGO 8000 debacle. Adverse publicity, that has been threatened to other independent mountain guides who have lost not a single client.
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Eiger Sanction

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

Analysis – The Mail on Sunday, January 30, 1994.  by Award Winning Investigative Journalist – Nick Fielding.

The article starts: ‘Tragedy that shattered the career of one of Britain’s top climbers.” Who in fact, continued to guide, and was reinstated (after a suitable time) into the Association of British Mountain Guides. The only career’s that were in fact, shattered, were the career’s of the three dead, BMG clients; their families crushed.
‘In the dangerous world of international mountaineering John Barry is a legend. (?) He has commanded the Army’s (Royal Marines) Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre and was once director of Britain’s premier climbing centre (that Pillar of Learning) Plas-y-Brenin in Snowdonia. The former Royal Marine Captain is proud of his historic first ascents of the world’s toughest mountains.
But today John Barry’s glittering career is in shreds. He has been stripped of his membership (for a while) of the British Mountain Guides for ‘professional misconduct’ following an accident on the Eiger in which three young British men (clients) died.
“I am facing ruin”, he said at his home in Llanrwst, Gwynedd. ‘I’ve searched my conscience, but I can’t see what I would have done differently.”
Phil Davies, of Southport, Merseyside (died sixteen days later in his mother’s arms) Willie Dunnachie, of Glasgow; and Douglas Gains of Harlow, Essex; died on the Eiger’s Western Flank on July 25, 1992 (Willie’s two sons joined mountainclients in 2005 and 2007).
Today (18 anniversary of the accident) Phil’s parents still cannot forgive John Barry. Graham, the father of Phil Davies, a Royal Marine reservist, Graham says: “There are those still alive who are culpable for this tragedy. There should have been a full inquiry.”
Edward Gaines, Douglas Gaines’s father, adds: “My thoughts on Mr Barry are unprintable.” His son and 15 other people from the ironically named – Survival Club, which specialised in exotic adventure holidays, travelled to Switzerland on July 18, 1992, to climb the ‘Big Three’ – the Eiger, Mont Blanc and the Matterhorn. Although most had some mountaineering experience, others had never attempted such a combination of expeditions.
Promoting the £375, two week trip, the aptly named Survival Club, whose director was – John Barry (BMG) said: ‘The Mont Blanc, Eiger and Matterhorn climbs are technically easy and within the scope of fit hill walkers…you do not need any previous experience.’ (Really!)
In reality, the Eiger is a killer mountain, a dangerous place on which, far too many people have died.
The party consisted of four experienced guides but only John Barry had a carnet, the supposed internationally recognised licence. On Monday, July 20, the party went by rail to Eismeer – the main starting point for Eiger climbers. The 16 started their ascent in separate roped parties, moving up to the Mittelligi hut where they spent the night.
The group woke at 5:00 am on Tuesday and decided to ascend the knife-edged Mittellegi Ridge (a graded climb) leading to the 3,970-metre peak.
But within hours, two of the parties were making very slow progress and Barry decided to return to Eismeer with these, including his own son, Tank,14. ‘I thought the two other more experienced parties would be down later that evening,’ he says.
Under the guidance of (unqualified, according to Bill O’Conner BMG) Dave Halton and (unqualified, according to Bill O’Conner BMG) Jan Rowe, a Faulkland veteran, and former contemporary of Barry’s from the Royal Marines, the two other parties continued up the mountain.
At midday the weather began to deteriorate. The official Swiss police report in to the accident says the group had been warned of heavy thunderstorms, although John Barry denies this: “The weather forecast was not bad, the storm was not predicted and talk of the mountain being in poor condition was nonsense”, he said.
According to notes compiled by Alison Summers, the only woman amongst the remaining climbers, a storm hit them half way up the mountain. The soles of their boots were scorched by lightening and the two parties lost each other.
Alison’s group, led by Dave Halton, set up a bivouac near the Fourth Step on the ridge. They had no stoves as these had been sent down by mistake with the less experienced climbers. They had no tents and only insulated sleeping bags. At a campsite below Eisner John Barry was not worried when the eight did not return by nightfall: “They all had bivvie bags and good clothing and Jan Rowe (unqualified according to O’Conner), who was leading the second group, is brilliant in emergencies.”
Next day, Wednesday July 22, the storm continued and the climbers could make only slow progress because of thick fog and light snowfall. But the two parties met up, reached the summit and then searched for a route down the Western Flank. They started moving down to about 3,600 metres, where they set up a bivouac for a second night.
But their descent was difficult. According to Alison Summers, no one had a route map – because John Barry had torn out the appropriate page from the guidebook. By evening Alison was becoming cold: ‘Spent rest of the night trying to keep awake and somewhat concerned I was about to slide down the mountain’, she wrote in her notes.
Dave Halton recalls: ‘By the second night in the open we were all very tired. It was really impossible to move any further.’
John Barry, still at the foot of the mountain, was beginning to worry. He called Air Glaciers, a local helicopter company, and arranged to fly next day with Bruno Durrer, who is both a doctor and mountain guide, to check on the climbers.
Christian Allmen, who runs the campsite at Schutzenbach where the return party was staying, says he urged Barry to rescue the eight climbers. ‘I said: “Those people will end up dead”.
At six the next morning the helicopter took of. Within ten minutes the pilot, Daniel Brunner, spotted the climbers. “I was staggered that they were all in military-style sleeping bags. Anyone on this fairly straightforward climb should not take such bulky equipment,’ he said. When Dr Durrer and Barry landed they asked if the climbers wanted to come off: ‘I entreated them to come down with the helicopter”, Dr Durrer recalls: “They declined my offer. The whole episode was foolhardy from the start and the British climbers should have come down with us.” Yet Barry insists: “They were in great form, pleased with themselves. I decided to stay and come down with them. The doctor left.”
The climbers including John Barry, who now remained with them, moved off. By 11 am the sun was out but many of the rocks were covered in black ice. There were three parties. First to leave was John Barry, roped to the weak and cold Alison Summers, followed by Jan Rowe leading (we now know he was unroped at the front) Dunnachie, Davies and Gaines. Then came Dave Halton guiding the two other climbers, Paul Roose and Lanning Vogel. Barry made good speed and was soon ahead. But 15 minutes later he heard a cry behind. He recalls: “To my horror I saw someone had slipped. A figure was sliding across a patch of snow and pulling the others with him. I turned Alison’s head away. I told her not to look. I unroped (from the weak and cold Alison) and ran across. I discovered three of them, but I could not find Jan (not roped to the three) although I could hear him shouting. I checked the breathing of the three others; I thought they were all dead.”
In fact Phil Davies was still alive. But he died in a coma 19 days later (in his mothers arms). He was 27 years old.
John Barry headed down the mountain alone and alerted the rescue service at 12:25 pm. The first helicopter carrying Dr Durrer, again, arrived half an hour later. Phil Davies was in fact in a critical condition and Jan Rowe concussed with broken bones and a ruptured liver. Dr Durrer insisted the expedition must be abandonded. But even then, some of the surviving climbers argued with him: “I had to order them off the mountain”, he recalls.
In February (1993) an inquest at Southport, ruled that Phil Davies’s and Douglas Gaines’s deaths were accidental. There has never been an inquest into the death of 34-year-old William Dunnachie. Yet the Swiss Police report into the tragedy criticises both John Barry and the other leaders (there were no criminal charges or deportations). It points out that Swiss guides are allowed to take only two climbers each on the Eiger. And, significantly, it says that during descents the guide – must always – go down last – roped – to this clients. Yet Jan Rowe went down – first, his party roped (there is now a question mark in Rowes case) behind him.The report stresses: ‘Countless – mistakes were made (basic errors). The choice of route was not suitable for the abilities of the guests (clients). The ground rule “the weakest determines the speed” was clearly not followed: ‘Little attention was paid to the weather forecast and weather development during the climb. To build a four-rope party with partly begginners in this terrain must be judged as careless.’ (Swiss Police Report).
John Barry is appealing against the withdrawl of his guiding carnet.  He says: ‘I was not on the mountain for most of the time (why?) and when I did go up I found them in good shape and decided to come down with them. I was not with the party that slipped (he could see quite clearly that Jan Rowe was not safeguarding his ropes from the rear and did nothing about it) and did everything I could to help (not acording the Phil Davies parents). But the question remains: Why did Barry, the only qualified guide, leave the mountain instead of staying with the rest of the climbing party? Why did he not check the weather reports properly? Why did he not, like Dr Durrer, insist the climbers come off the mountain? And why did he not make the party follow the proper descent (safety) rules?
And yet, Barry feels that he did little wrong. But for Edward Gaines, father of 28-year-old Douglas, that can never be enough. He says: ‘I never understood why my son loved climbing. My best memory of him is when he returned from a previous climb of Mont Blanc. He was on cloud nine. I was worried and told him to join a ‘proper’ (BMC/BMG) climbing club – that’s what he did – the Survival Club.’
‘Now Douglas is dead. Someone has to bear the responsibility.’
Graham Davies travelled to N. Wales and met John Barry at  his home. Graham, gave me a copy of his thought’s; observations (six pages) after the visit.
The clients had not acclimatised. The party was too inexperienced for such a challenge. The party was too large for such a climb (the Mittilegi Ridge is a technical climb) and very dangerous in a storm. Weather conditions were ignored. The climb took too long and should have been aborted but the teams on the upper mountain were trapped – a reocurring feature of the Eiger as a potentially lethal peak and these guides knew it. The clients were ill equipment – that basic error in fact stopped further loss of life as it turned out – no thanks to the guides. A debacle that beggers belief.
On the 30 November, 2002, Bill o´Connor BMG sent me an email:- “Eiger Accident: the guide in charge of the clients who died on the Eiger was in fact an ex royal marine and an unqualified guide {according to Mr O’Connor, the guide, in the employ of Mr Barry, was descending unroped from his clients}, like yourself {like me – and Mal Duff, Cubby Cuthberton {initially} ISM {initially} etc., etc., etc). The only member of the BMG and a qualified guide (also ex marine) was in fact not on the mountain at the time of the accident, having turned back, several days before ´with his client´(? in fact – his own son) during the ascent because he was unhappy about conditions and weather…”** When in fact, the BMG guide in question, Mr J. Barry, actually – witnessed the fatal accident being just meter´s away! **Bill O’Connor made no mention of the at least, thirteen BMG clients killed since – 1988 whilst with qualified guides (BMG). I wonder why?
On the 28 Feb, 1998, Ron James, the then (BMG) President, wrote (on BMG headed note paper) to a Norwich Union (an insurance company that lost a £450,000 libel case in 1997) Defence solicitor, Mr Guy: “The law in France as in most Alpine countries/regions only permit fully qualified persons to work as Mountain Guides on Alpine peaks. In France unqualified persons acting as guides are escorted (unless they are working for the BMG of course) from the the mountains by Alpine gendarmes and could face criminal charges.” If that is correct; if the above comments are true, then why did’nt Mr James, contact Mr Graham Davies or any of the other parents or their – solicitors, (as we have seen, Ron James is not adversed to contacting solicitors on behalf of the BMG) with similar information in 1992…or since.?
On the 21st March, 2005, Dean Dunnachie who lost his father – William Dunnachie a member of the Survival Club on that fateful day in 1992 on the West Flank of the Eiger joined – mountainclients.org.uk On the 3 March, 2009, mountainclients received an e-mail from – William Dunnachie a second son – a young man named after his father.
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Dartmoor Blizzard

Monday, June 2nd, 2008

Air Cadets trapped in a Blizzard on Dartmoor April, 1981, Where and when, to start searching?

Easter was late in 1981 on Dartmoor when 13 Air cadets arrived at Oakhampton for a weekend’s adventure training. Some, were in training for the forthcoming Ten Tors event. On the Saturday morning the parties were briefed on the weather forcast (which was pretty bad) from RAF Mount Batten in Plymouth. They (still) set off with each party walking a circular contro rotaing route. The younger air cadets were to go to Yes Tor, High Willhays, Dinger Tor, Cranmere Pool, Hangignstone Hill, Oke Tor and back to their base at Oakhampton. The older cadets were to walk the route in reverse. Whilst the younger cadets finished their route safely, the older cadets met sever weather conditions. Suddenly, out of the East came a blizzard. Misstrusting their compasses the cadets erected their tent’s and assessed the situation. By this time their supervisors were becoming very concerned and reported the facts to to the Oakhampton Police and the Dartmoor Rescue group under Fred Barlow. All that evening and night, they waited on the edge of the Norther moor. It was a task that was to eventually last for more than two days and involve RAF and Royal Navy helicopters, Royal Marine’s with Snow-Cats and many hundreds of searchers from the Dartmoor Rescue Group and the Police.

The older group of cadets had been passing Cranmere Pool when the wind and driving snow from the East became too much for them and they turned West, the freezing wind to their backs. There original itenary was to walk due North past Cranmere to the military, battle camp at Oakhampton. Fortunetely, they had camping equipment with them and so they camped. The snow became deeper (up to 20 foot drifts) and the blizzard raged for more than two days.

According to local television, the moors were surrounded, ringed with: members of the Dartmoor Rescue Team, the police, Royal Marines and the military, helicopters were on standby. The plan apparently, was to have these personel in position around the edge (nobody apparently knew from which edge of the moor the cadets would emerge) off the moor so that, once the blizzard abated, the would be rescuers could enter the moor and then, and only then, start to search for the cadets. but where were the cadets. Where and when would their rescuers, start to search?

I had assembled equipment for attempting to rescue people in winter conditions in the late 1970′s  after a new’s item that followed the demise of many motorists trapped on the coast road to Hiffa, Isreal, where military personel were arranged at each end of a massive blizzard waiting to enter and rescue motorists known to be trapped in the sudden storm. When the blizzard finally abated, 35 motorists were found in their cars – dead.

The police at Oakhampton told me too stay away when I telephoned and offered my services (police actually consulted with a local star gazer who was asked to envisage were the cadets might emerge – she said the Cadets would emerge of the moor by a stone-cross – there are 100′s of stone-cross’s on Dartmoor) . On the Monday morning, I collecting my equipment together and drove with difficulty due to thick snow on the main road around Dartmoor to Sourton where I parked and donned my equipment, a rucksack filled with food, warm clothing and sleeping bag – a one piece, expandable (into a bivi-bag) waterproof suit and a full-face-helmet with a compass embedded in the visor. I set off into the Northern moor on a compass bearing reading due South. I had calculated that the cadets would turn West due to the bitter Easterly wind and that they would emerge off the Western side of the Norther moor (they self rescued out of the western edge of the North moor at Widgery Cross near Lydford) – if they survived.

I walked slowly due South all day. It mattered not that I was being buffetted by very strong, icy cold wind. My intention was to walk for a day and then bivouac in my suit until the storm abated and thus be in a position – within the moor, to look for any movement once the storm abated. It was after midday when the rear edge of the wintery system appeared from the East with blue sky behind it. Because of the early arrival of the rear edge of the bad weather, I changed direction and walked, through deep snow, to the summit of High Willhay (the highest point on Dartmoor) for a better view of the moor to the South of me through binoculars. There was no movement on the ground.

Almost immedately, a helicopter flew across the Northern moor towards me and over me – it did not see me. Fortunely, I was not one of the Cadets struggling to survive after a gruelling experience because the helicopter merely flew past me (I was dressed in a bright red one peice suit) and disappeared to the South West. I bivouaced for the night on High Willhays (the suit pulled out; expanded into a bivi bag). During that clear night I saw no torch lights; no indication that anyone was in the North moor. The next day, I retraced my steps to Sourton and returned to Saltash. The cadets had self rescued during the afternoon of clearing weather.

Nobody would have known that someone had actually been in the middle of the moor searching until I saw members of the Dartmoor Rescue Group (on Television) slapping each other on the back after the (rescue of the Cadets?) cadets who in fact, self rescued out of the Western side of the North Moor through Widdery Cross almost exactly on my compass bearing down through the Western side of the Northern moor.

It would have been a different story if the blizzard had continued for many more days. The only person in the middle of the moor with the intention of waiting there; to be on-hand to assist quickly was threatened with being sued by the Air Cadets Commander until that is, they reolised that just one man and not a whole organisation had actually been inside the moor looking for his lost – Cadets. But why threaten to sue – anyway?? The reaction of a worried man; Commander no doubt. The national weather forcast was not good, in fact very bad, prior to the cadets entering the moor. The worst blizzard in living memory at that time of the year was approaching from the North East and it almost claimed numerous young lives to say nothing of the fact, that some aquired frost bite but it could so easily, have been much worse.

The equipment that allowed me to entrer and survive in the moor in those conditions was shelved. In the years since, all too many climbers have died in similar conditions, died wearing gore-tex covered layers a gore-tex covered shroud. Equipment does not make the man; the climber.

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