Basic mistakes
Monday, June 2nd, 2008
Numerous basic mistakes lead to an avoidable multiple, fatal accident…
In the winter of 1972, the senior British Mountaineering Council (BMC) club in the Birmingham area; the Midland Asociation of Mountaineers, organised a meeting that was attended by the then, Hon Secretary of the BMC: Peter Ledeboer. he began the evening with an introduction that included reference to the fact that, the BMC was ‘taking over’ administration of the Mountain Leadership scheme on the 1st January, 1973. Immediately, a member of the audience ran to the stage and attacked Ledeboer screaming: “Murderers, molesters!” It transpired that the outburst had been brought about by the involvement of a ‘qualified’ mountain leader, trained individual, being in charge of the school party involved in the Cairngorm tragedy in November, 1971. The individual who has caused the interruption, apparently believed that such schemes as mountain leader training were directly responsible for the deaths of six young people in the – Cairngorm tragedy. That individual, was of course correct. he actually called the BMC: murderers; molesters…
(read Rogorous and Robust Rules?)
The fatal accident that befell three BMG clients on the West Flank of the Eiger on the 25 July, 1992, was totally avoidable. The whole story, contained in an article by Nick Fielding, an investigative reporter, ‘Analysis’, printed on the 30 January, 1994 in The Mail on Sunday, explains a series of errors that lead to the eventual deaths.
16 clients, of the ironically named: Survival Club (BMG), were taken by rail to Grindlewald in Switzerland, on the 18 July, 1992. On the 20 July, the large team went to Eismeer, a starting point for the, knife edged, Mittellegi Ridge. Without any prior acclimatisation; training on any of the surrounding peaks, they were taken on the first stage of the climb to the Mittelligi hut half way up the ridge, where they spent the night. The next day, they climbed the upper ridge – into a gathering storm. Almost immediately, two of the party could not cope (carrying heavy rucksacks and not acclimatised) and were taken down the mountain by ‘the head’ BMG guide . The leading guide left; allowing the others to continue upward. One of those that he brought off the mountain was his – own son.
According to notes complied by Alison Summers, the only woman among the remaining climbers: a storm (it had been forecast) hit them half way up the mountain. The soles of their boots were scorched by lightening and the two parties lost each other. Alsion’s rope led by Dave Halton, set up a bivoauc near the Fourth Step on the ridge. They had no stoves as these had been taken down by mistake with the less experienced (exhausted) climbers.
At a campsite below Eismeer, John Barry was not worried when the eight did not return by nightfall.
After struggling to the summit in very bad weather, the two teams searched for the descent route. According to Alsion Summers: no one had a route map because John Barry had – torn out the appropriate page from the – guide book. (John Barry, still at the foot of the mountain was beginning to worry). They were spotted by a helocopter pilot next morning. Daniel Brunner, who is also a doctor and a mountain guide was appalled: ‘I was staggered that they were all in military-style sleeping bags. Anyone on this fairly straightforward climb should not take such bulky equipment.’ he said.
The Swiss Accident Report stresses: ‘Countless mistakes were made. The chosen route was not suitable for the ability of the clients. The ground rule “the weakest determines the speed” was clearly not followed. Little attention was paid to the weather forecast and weather developments during the climb. To build a four-rope party with a party of beginners in this terrian must be judged as – careless.’ (BMG Internet advertising still states: ‘Our members are competent in – all aspect of client care.’
Guide not To Blame
Daily Telegraph Feb, 2001
‘The fatal accident inquiry into the 1998 avalanche on Aonach Mor in which four (more BMG clients) young climbers died (entombed in consolidating snow and ice) has cleared their (member of the Association of British Mountain Guides) mountain guide Roger Wild of any blame.
However, Sheriff Forbes levelled some criticism at the Association of British Mountain Guides, labelling conflicting opinions from past and present presidents on whether members should carry mobile phones as “counter-productive” adding that “clear guidance should be given.” (Clear ‘guidance in common sense should be given’ to the elite association??)
He also suggested that the BMG should investigate a system of – check-in and check-out (a basic requirement of all intelligent hill walkers, climbers and mountaineers – for many years) with the operators of the Nevis Range ski-lift, so that non-apearance of parties might be noted.’
The criticism once again, was about basic mistakes by the BMG; mistakes that have cost the lives of so many of their clients – thus far… Once again, the British Mountaineering Council has not given full publicity; any publicity to another avoidable; multiple fatal accident this time, to four young Venture Scouts, clients of the BMG on the 28 December, 1998.
Mountain clients should be familier with the tying of climbing knots and basic climbing techniques including abseiling from a good book. Do not rely solely on the ‘expert’. A picture exits, on the front cover of a specialist climbing magazine (High the then official magazine of the – BMC no less) showing the very basic, mistake of abseiling (off the Old man of Hoy) on a karabiner the safety gate of which, is stuck – wide open!
Whilst on the subject of abseiling, another British climber has been killed in an abseiling accident in Zion National Park when apparently, the knot joining two abseil rope together completely unravelled. Had the ropes been joined by the traditonal Double-Fishermans knot (and they were not in this avoidable tragedy) then the ropes would not have parted. That the BMC?BMG now condones the tying of abseil ropes together with the British Death Knot (overhand – knot) other than the Double-Fisherman was – predictable. The organisations attitude towards safety even where the tying of climbing knots is concerned has been evident for many years. The full colour picture on the front cover of the BMC’s ‘Booket of Knots’ which was published over twenty years ago, still shows a Double-Fishermans knot tied – incorrectly, hapazardly. That the same booklet, advocated in the last colour picture the belaying of a – lead climber with an Italian Hitch, beggers belief. These simple mistakes were drawn to the BMC’s attention in the 1980′s – nothing happened; nothing has changed.
Climbers are apparently, in shock and horror after it was learnt that one of America’s top rock climbers has been killed in an abseiling accident (November, 2006). Apparently, his climbing harness broke, the belay-loop at the front of the harness broke… His safety rope that should, could have been tied through the harness as per the manufacturer’s instructions, if it had been used could have saved his life.
Today (2008) the vast majority of young people introduced; enticed to climb on artificial climbing walls are tied into their harnesses in exactly the same way as the unfortunate climber above met his end – tied througth the abseil-loop of the safety harness. But in their case their actual safety rope is tied wrongly into theit harness.
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